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I. Introduction
Gender-unequal treatment in developing countries—be it in, labormarket earn-
ings, or asset ownership—is well documented (e.g., Sen 2001; Duflo 2012). Be-
yond the implication for women’s well-being, this unequal treatment also has
ramifications for the economic development of these countries. For example,
the International Monetary Fund reports that reducing the gender wage gap
in theMiddle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan region to levels twice
as large as those found in emerging markets could generate extra gross domestic
product (GDP) of $1 trillion in a decade to the region (AFP 2013). In this pa-
per, we use economic decision-making experiments from Pakistan (1) to inves-
tigate whether and how young educated Pakistani women of heterogeneous
backgrounds are discriminated against by socially disparate groups of highly
educated young men, (2) to evaluate the nature of this discrimination (taste
based vs. statistical), and (3) to analyze how the nature of the discrimination var-
ies by the social status of both genders.
We focus on Pakistani society because gender inequality is particularly pro-
nounced in South Asia. Klasen (1994) and Sen (2001) have highlighted Pa-
kistan as a country where this imbalance is the starkest, with a population sex
ratio most recently estimated to be 108.5 males for every 100 females (PakistanWe thank Olivier Armantier, Sonia Bhalotra, Michelle Belot, Abhishek Chakravarty, Patrick Nolen,
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2 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G ECensus Organization 1998). In the labor market, women ages 20–30 with a
college degree earn on average 28% less than their male counterparts.1 More-
over, gender discrimination in Pakistan appears paradoxical, with women hav-
ing prominent political leadership (e.g., Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto was the first woman to lead an Islamic state) but also facing severe dis-
crimination. For example, an estimated 13% of women are missing, the gender
gap in literacy is increasing, the rate of violence against women is alarming, and
the female labor force participation rate is 15%, which is low compared with
other countries with similar GDP per capita (Klasen and Wink 2003; Coleman
2004; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2009).
To investigate the interplay between gender discrimination and social iden-
tity, we recruited 2,836 students pursuing bachelor-equivalent degrees from
three types of educational institutions in urban Pakistan that represent three very
different identities in terms of socioeconomic background, religiosity, and ex-
posure to Western ideas. Our focus on interactions of interelite groups (defined as
college-level students) is of particular interest because individuals belonging
to these groups are likely to become policy makers or be influential in their com-
munities. We use the student’s institutional affiliation as a measure of his or her
social identity. Our definition of social status is therefore based on real groups
rather than induced groups (see, e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Goette,
Huffman, and Meier 2006; Bhattacharya and Dugar 2014). The first type of in-
stitution consists of male-only madrassas (religious seminaries). The madrassa
curriculum uses ancient religious texts and does not impart any secular teaching.
Islamic universities (the second type of institution) teach a liberal arts curriculum
combined with Islamic teachings in gender-segregated campuses. The third type
is liberal universities, which are similar to American universities: campuses are
mixed, classes are taught in English, and students are widely exposed to Western
ideas.Whilemadrassas tend to be free and thus cater primarily to the poor, Islamic
universities are usually public and therefore are accessible to low- and middle-
income groups. Liberal universities, on the other hand, charge expensive tuitions
and thus serve the wealthy segment of the population. On the socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES) scale, students at liberal universities rank on average highest, followed
by Islamic university students, with madrassa students being lowest on this scale.
In addition, these three groups also differ in their levels of religiosity. Self-reported
religiosity (on a scale from 0 to 10) is 9.2 among madrassa students, 6.3 among
male Islamic university students, and 5.3 among male liberal university students.
To investigate gender discrimination, we study a particular aspect of so-
cial and economic interactions: trust. Our focus on trust stems from a large1 Authors’ calculations based on the 2007–8 and 2008–9 Pakistan Labour Force Survey.
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Delavande and Zafar 3literature showing that trust enhances efficiency and promotes economic growth,
financial development, and production efficiency (e.g., Knack and Keefer
1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Özer, Zheng,
and Ren 2014). Moreover, trust is particularly important in developing coun-
tries where, because of the failure of the state, informal and traditional institu-
tions matter considerably more (Ostrom 1990; Fukuyama 1995). In fact, ev-
idence points to economic development being highly correlated with the
ability to trust and cooperate with strangers (Buchan et al. 2009). We measure
trust by randomly matching students with each other (on the basis of gender
and institutional affiliation [our measure of their social identity]) to participate
in a trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, andMcCabe 1995). In the trust game, a player
(sender) can decide to send (invest) money to a partner (receiver). If the sender
invests the money, the experimenter triples that amount and gives it to the re-
ceiver, who is asked to choose whether (s)he transfers any money back to the
sender. Systematic differences in the decision to invest the money based on
the gender of the partner would imply gender discrimination. This type of
game captures important behavioral aspects of social and economic interac-
tions (including those taking place in the labor market) and is therefore well
suited to investigate gender discrimination.
Effective policies to address discrimination cannot be crafted without under-
standing the nature of discrimination, that is, whether it is motivated by pref-
erences (taste-based discrimination) or statistical inference on payoff-relevant
information (statistical discrimination). For this purpose, we use a multiple-
game design. We also ask respondents to participate in other experiments of
decision-making that measure expected trustworthiness (expectations in the trust
game) and unconditional other-regarding behavior, such as altruism or in-
equity aversion (dictator game). In the dictator game, the sender is asked to
split an amount of money between himself and another player, who takes no
further action. Therefore, systematic differences in the amount sent to males
and females in the dictator game measure taste-based discrimination (Becker
1957). In the trust game, expectations about how much participants anticipate
getting back on average from their partner allow us to measure whether the dis-
crimination is statistical.
Our main finding is that the intensity and nature of gender discrimination
depend on the social identity of both individuals in the match. Liberal univer-
sity male students (who are on average the wealthiest, least religious, and most
exposed to Western ideas) do not discriminate against women of any social
identity. Madrassa students (who come from more humble backgrounds and
are more religious and relatively unexposed to Western ideas) tend to discrim-
inate against Islamic university (i.e., middle SES) women but not liberalThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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4 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Euniversity (high SES) women in the trust game. Moreover, this discrimination
is entirely taste based. However, although madrassa students treat men relatively
better than women because they give and trust more than other male groups,
they actually treat women the best in absolute terms. Finally, Islamic university
male students (who fare in the middle in terms of wealth and religiosity) have a
less uniform behavior: in the trust game, they favor liberal university (high SES)
females but do not favor Islamic university females (middle SES) compared with
their respective male counterparts. Importantly, while we cannot rule out taste-
based discrimination playing some role, the differential behavior by gender of
Islamic university students is primarily attributable to statistical discrimination.
These findings are in contrast to what we find from Delavande and Zafar
(2015), in which we use the same experiments and the same institutions but
focus on male-to-male interactions: the behavior of our male respondents
matched with male partners does not differ by the institution of their match;
that is, social identity is irrelevant in the male-male interactions. In particular,
there is no evidence of in- or out-group bias for madrassa students interacting
with males from other segments of Pakistani society. Moreover, counter to
common stereotypes (and those of our sample), male madrassa students are
found to exhibit the most other-regarding and trusting behavior. So in this
context, social identity matters only in the male-female interactions.2
It has been argued that pushing for policies favoring economic development
(such as education policy) will lead to an improvement in women’s rights and
status (Doepke and Tertilt 2009; Duflo 2012). Our findings—based on a sub-
ject pool where all respondents are pursuing bachelor-equivalent degrees (and
thus belong to an elite group in the society)—show that higher SES females
(liberal university females) are not discriminated against and are even favored
in some instances by males and that women of (relatively) lower SES (Islamic
university females) are discriminated against by certain groups of men. This
suggests that educating women may not be a sufficient condition for women’s
position to improve, as their social identities continue to matter. This further
suggests that social policies aimed at improving women’s underrepresentation
in the political sphere or the labor market through gender quotas (e.g., Beaman
et al. 2009; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2013; Bertrand et al. 2014) may
need to account for the interaction of gender with social identity and possibly
allocate gender quotas on the basis of the socioeconomic background of women.2 Similar asymmetries have been found in other contexts. For example, in the United States, Newton
and Simutin (2014) find that older and male CEOs are more likely to set higher wages for male rather
than female officers, whereas little evidence shows that female CEOs set wages according to the gen-
der of the officer.
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Delavande and Zafar 5Our paper complements the large body of empirical evidence on gender un-
equal treatment in South Asia (e.g., Qian 2008; Duflo 2012), with a specific
focus on the role of the social identities of the interacting parties, for which
the evidence is mixed for within-household interactions and scant beyond intra-
household interactions. Our paper also relates to a large literature on gender dis-
crimination in the labor market and other market interactions, mostly in devel-
oped countries (see Altonji and Blank 1999; List and Rasul 2011). Audit studies
or sex-blind hiring (e.g., Ayres and Siegelman 1995;Neumark 1996;Goldin and
Rouse 2000) and estimates of differential marginal productivity (Hellerstein,
Neumark, and Troske 1999) have been used to identify gender discrimination.
Given lack of data, however, it is generally difficult to identify the nature of this
discrimination. Recent studies using either field or laboratory experiments have
been able to directly address the nature of gender discrimination by using a
multigame design, which is able to measure both preferences and beliefs or to
manipulate the market under study (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; List
2004; Slonim and Guillen 2010; Castillo et al. 2013). Fershtman and Gneezy
(whose study is the closest in approach to that used in this paper) match students
with typical ethnic names in Israel and find strong evidence that Ashkenazic
women (who tend to have higher economic status) are less trusted than Ashke-
nazic men, whereas eastern women (who tend to have lower economic status)
are more trusted then eastern men. This suggests (unlike in the Pakistani con-
text) that discrimination against females is reduced and even reversed when they
belong to lower SES groups.
As part of the large body of empirical evidence on gender unequal treatment
in South Asia, there has been some investigation into the relationship between
gender discrimination and SES or social class of the households. However, the
resulting empirical evidence is rather mixed. In some cases, higher economic
status households are found to discriminate less against girls: Rose (1999) finds
that landholdings increase the survival of girls relative to boys, and Behrman
(1988) and Alderman and Gertler (1997) find that households with more in-
come treat boys and girls more equally in terms of allocation of nutrients and
medical care, respectively. However, Basu (1989) and Miller (1997) find that
higher SES households (as measured by caste or income) discriminate more
against girls, especially in the northwestern plains of Asia, where the society is
patrilineal. Similarly, Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) show that prenatal sex de-
tection and female feticide are greater in relatively wealthy and educated fam-
ilies. Our paper contributes to the understanding of the relationship between
social status and gender discrimination in South Asia beyond the one found
within the household and in a setup relevant to labor markets.This content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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(Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2000). This theory argues that women experience
discrimination in varying levels of intensity, which is determined by intersec-
tional systems of society (e.g., race, ethnicity, social class). In line with this the-
ory, studies have found that labor market discrimination and stereotyping tend
to be worse for women who fall to the bottom of the social hierarchy in terms
of race (Browne and Misra 2003). Our findings that higher SES women in Pa-
kistan are less discriminated against are consistent with this theory.
This paper is organized as follows. We provide some background informa-
tion on the institutions we surveyed and the sample in Section II. Section III
outlines a simple theoretical model that provides a guide for the empirical anal-
ysis. Section IV explains the experimental design, and Section V presents the
empirical results. Section VI discusses some potential mechanisms for the find-
ings, and Section VII presents concluding remarks.
II. Background
A. The Educational Institutions
Higher education in Pakistan takes place in universities and madrassas (religious
seminaries). The enrollment rate for students ages 17–23 is 5.1%. One-third
of the students enrolled in universities are female (AEPAM 2011). There are now
138 universities in the country recognized by the Higher Education Commis-
sion Pakistan (2012), of which 75 are public and 63 are private. There remains
considerable disagreement over the extent of the penetration of madrassas be-
cause few are registered. However, Ahmad (2004) estimates that there are about
6,000 secondary and higher madrassas, educating about 600,000 students.
We conducted experiments in four male madrassas, one public Islamic uni-
versity, and two private liberal universities located in Islamabad/Rawalpindi
and Lahore between May and October 2010.3 We describe each of those
institutions.
Madrassas base their studies on texts dating to before the fourteenth century
and teach classes in Urdu (Fair 2006; Rahman 2008). The majority of madras-
sas do not impart any secular or vocational training, and it has been argued (al-
beit with scant evidence) that they deliberately educate their students in narrow
worldviews and rejection of Western ideas and do not train them sufficiently
for the real world (Ali 2009). Claims made by policy makers and in the popular
press suggest that they may be responsible for fostering militancy and Islamic3 There are few female madrassas, and the proportion of females pursuing a bachelor-equivalent de-
gree (the relevant population for our purposes) is even smaller. Because large sample sizes are needed
for the randomizations in the experiment, we did not include them in our sample.
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Delavande and Zafar 7extremism (see Delavande and Zafar 2015). Because madrassas generally tend
to be free, they attract students frommodest backgrounds (Rahman 2004). Ad-
vanced study within the madrassas produces an Alim (Islamic scholar and/or
teacher). Most students who graduate from a madrassa go on to work in the
religious sector.
Islamic universities provide a liberal arts curriculum combined with Islamic
teachings and courses. For example, economics is taught with a focus on Islamic
principles of finance. These universities have segregated campuses for males and
females, and classes are taught in Arabic or English. They tend to be public and
are therefore accessible to low- and middle-income groups. Moreover, a rela-
tively large proportion of students at such universities have typically studied for
some time at madrassas before enrolling. Females account for about 40% of
the student body at an Islamic university.
Liberal universities are similar to American colleges. They provide a liberal
arts curriculum, teach classes in English, and have gender-mixed campuses. Tu-
ition at such institutions tends to be very expensive, so they cater to wealthy
students. Females account for about 25%–30% of the student body at the two
institutions we surveyed.4
B. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Data collection was conducted by the survey center affiliated with the Islamic
university. The institutions in our sample are among the five largest and most
well-regarded institutions in their respective category in each city. Among all
the institutions we contacted, one university and one madrassa refused to par-
ticipate. We sampled the senior-most students in the four madrassas because
they are similar in age to university students and are pursuing degrees that are
equivalent to bachelor degrees. Although participation was voluntary, almost
everyone in the madrassas participated in the study. At the other institutions,
a random sample of students (unconditional on gender) was selected to par-
ticipate on the basis of a listing of students provided by the registrar’s office.
The average response rate at the universities was about 70%. To signal cred-
ibility of the study to the students, members of the staff of the institution at
which data were being collected were also hired for the data collection. Over-
all 2,836 students participated in the experiments, of which 489 were female.
The ethnic composition of students is quite similar across the institutions.4 In a previous study (Delavande and Zafar 2015), we separate the two liberal universities where we
interviewed. In the present context, we find very similar behavior toward females and therefore keep
them as one group to simplify the presentation of results.
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8 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G ETable 1 presents the characteristics of the participants by group (educational
affiliation) and gender. For comparison purposes, the table also shows the char-
acteristics of a random sample of respondents from Islamabad/Rawalpindi and
Lahore (city sample) obtained from a separate survey we conducted in 2010.
The average age of students varies between 21 and 22 years.
Table 1 highlights the differences across the three types of institutions.5 The
sorting in terms of observables into these institutions is very drastic but not un-
expected. As wemove across the columns from the liberal university (denoted as
HighSES) toward the Islamic university (denoted as MidSES) and the madras-
sas in table 1, the average socioeconomic characteristics deteriorate. For exam-
ple, the monthly parental income of male and female students at HighSES is
about seven times that of students in the madrassas, and fathers’ years of educa-
tion are almost twice as many. If we compare the students with the city sample
(cols. 6, 7), we see that madrassa students seem to come from less well-off back-
grounds than the general populations in the cities, whereas all other institutions
fare better in terms of most indicators of wealth. Females at HighSES and
MidSES tend to come from slightly more privileged backgrounds than their
male counterparts: on average, they have higher parental income, parental ed-
ucation, and asset ownership. This difference is more marked at MidSES.
Students from the various groups also show different levels of self-reported
religiosity and the number of prayers per day. Students were asked to rate how
religious they considered themselves to be on a scale from 0 (not religious at
all) to 10 (very religious). Religiosity increases as we move across columns of
table 1; the average religiosity is 5.6–5.7 for HighSESmales and females com-
pared with 9.2 in the madrassas. The former also pray much less frequently
each day (2–2.4 vs. 4.9 times).
Finally, students are exposed to different types of information and different
peer groups. While only 23% of the madrassa students report watching BBC
and CNN, at least 59% of the students of the other groups report watching
it. Within HighSES, female students tend to watch those international news
channels more than male students. Also, the proportion of male respondents
who have ever attended a religious institution on a full-time or part-time basis
increases from 35% for HighSES students to 45% for MidSES students. In
addition, whereas fathers of only 11% (5%) of male (female) students attend-
ing HighSES spent more than 2 years studying in a madrassa on either a part-
time or a full-time basis, the corresponding proportion for madrassa students is5 Because we find no significant differences within the madrassas in terms of either demographic
characteristics or their experimental behavior, we combine the four madrassas into one group to keep
the tables and analysis simple.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS
HighSES MidSES Madrassa City
Male Female Male Female Male Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of observations 758 203 444 286 1,145 394 341
Age 21 21 22 22* 22 34 31**
(2.8) (3.4) (2.5) (2.2) (3) (13) (12)
Years of education:
Father 12 12 11 13*** 7.1 7.7 11***
(5.2) (5.4) (4.2) (3.2) (5) (5.4) (4.7)
Mother 12 13*** 7.1 9*** 3.4 4 7.5***
(4.4) (3.6) (5.1) (4.5) (4.4) (4.9) (5.3)
Parent income (thousands of Rs) 127 155* 42 66*** 20 25 30
(182) (212) (52) (121) (60) (24) (31)
Income (%):a
Middle 27.0 17.7*** 53.0 42.6*** 33.8 55.2 45.0*
High 69.0 79.3*** 32.3 48.2*** 8.0 14.7 22.9**
Number of siblings 3.5 3*** 4.5 4.2* 5.1 4.3***
(2) (1.7) (2.3) (2) (3) (2.5)
Attend religious school (%)b 35 19*** 45 30*** 100 9 12
Father madrassa (%)c 11 5** 12 8* 20 1 1
Parents own (%):
Home 88 87 82 79 82 100 100
Television 85 87 79 93*** 30 84 56***
Cell phone 83 85 80 87** 74 97 84***
Computer 74 78 59 74*** 25 70 51***
Internet access 57 67** 39 52*** 7 45 35***
Motorbike 59 48*** 50 42** 33 61 19***
Car 72 81** 41 57*** 10 37 25***
Religiosity (0–10)d 5.7 5.6 6.3 6.3 9.2 6.1 6.3
(1.8) (1.6) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) (2.4) (1.8)
Middle religiosity (6–8; %) 43.7 40.7 53.3 58.8 16.9 30.2 47.6***
High religiosity (9–10; %) 5.8 4.2 8.3 5.6 77.5 19.0 12.7**
Number of times praying per day 2 2.4*** 2.9 3.6*** 4.9 2.9 3.6***
(1.7) (1.7) (1.7) (1.3) (.42) (1.9) (1.5)
Proportion that fast Ramadhan .91 .87** .96 .94* .98 .89 .88
(.21) (.25) (.15) (.17) (.12) (.24) (.25)
Truste 4.6 4*** 4.6 3.9** 5.1
(2.4) (2.4) (2.7) (2.8) (3.4)
Risk generalf 6.8 7 6.6 6.1** 5.2
(2.3) (2.1) (2.4) (2.5) (3.9)
Watch (%):
English news 84 88 83 83 25 24 53***
BBC or CNN 59 70*** 60 59 23 12 25***This content dow
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ournals.ucNote. Shown are pairwise t-tests for male vs. female characteristics within each institution. Asterisks are
shown in female columns.
a Middle income: Rs 9,000–32,500; high income: >Rs 32,500.
b Percentage of respondents who have ever attended a religious institution (full-time or part-time).
c Percentage of respondents whose father attended a madrassa or any religious institution for more than
2 years (either part-time or full-time).
d Self-reported religiosity on a scale of 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).
e Response to question “Most people can be trusted?” on a scale of 0 (all people cannot be trusted) to 10
(all people can be trusted).
f Self-reported risk preference on a scale of 0 (totally unwilling to take risk) to 10 (fully prepared to take
risks).
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.7 AM
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10 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E20%. This suggests that the various groups in our setting interact with and
have exposure to each other at some level but that the extent of exposure varies
by institution.
In short, table 1 shows that there is substantial sorting on observables into
institutions. Students attending these three types of institutions clearly repre-
sent very different social and religious identities within Pakistani society. At one
end of the spectrum, we have young males from poorer backgrounds who at-
tend religious schools. At the other end of the spectrum, we have wealthy stu-
dents exposed to a Western style of education and high exposure to interna-
tional media.
C. Earnings Expectations of Female Students
We speculate that women’s social identity influences the discrimination they
may suffer—in particular, in the labor market. As a motivating fact for our ex-
periments, we look at women and men’s expected earnings at age 30. These ex-
pectations were elicited as follows: “Consider the situation where you graduate
from [current institution]. Look ahead to when you will be 30 years old and
suppose that you are working then. Think about the kinds of jobs that will
be available to you. How much do you think you could earn per month on av-
erage at the age of 30 at these jobs?”
We find that at HighSES, women and men expect very similar earnings
at age 30 on average (Rs 46,694 for females and Rs 45,310 for males, p 5 :524
when testing equality of means), whereas at MidSES, females expect significantly
lower earnings than men on average (Rs 37,136 for females vs. Rs 44,079 for
males, p < :001 when testing equality of means). Note that these expectations
are conditional on working. Therefore, these patterns suggest that females
graduating from MidSES are on average more likely to expect less favorable
outcomes in the labor market (relative to their male counterparts) than females
graduating from HighSES. This is consistent with these MidSES females ex-
pecting to be discriminated against in the labor market, and if these expecta-
tions are predictive of actual future realizations (as has been shown in the liter-
ature; e.g., Dominitz 1998), then this also means that they will actually be
discriminated against in the labor market. We will assess whether the experi-
mental results are consistent with this.
III. Theoretical Framework
Here we present a simple stylized model of behavior. The trust and dictator
games with identity (i.e., social background, in reference to the student’s in-
stitution) illustrate the mechanisms that can lead to observed choices in theseThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 11games. Incorporating identity directly into the utility function was introduced
into economic analysis by Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
Consider a player with social background s and gender g. His utility usg(.,.)
is assumed to depend on his own payoff and that of his partner of character-
istics (s 0, g 0 ). Several papers have modeled the motivation for other-regarding
behavior, that is, deriving utility from others’ payoffs. It could take the form
of altruism (Andreoni andMiller 2002), warm glow (Andreoni 1990), inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), or maximum
preferences (Charness and Rabin 2002). We are agnostic here about these un-
derlying motivations.
For simplicity, we assume that the player’s utility is linear in both his payoff
and in a strictly concave function bs,g,s 0,g 0(.) of his partner’s payoff 0(bs,g ,s0,g 0 ð:Þ > 0
and b00s,g ,s0,g 0 ð:Þ<0), which equals zero if the partner has zero payoff (bs,g ,s0,g 0 ð0Þ50).
The function bs,g,s 0,g 0(.) depends on the characteristics of both players and cap-
tures how much a player with characteristics (s,g) values the payoff of a part-
ner with characteristics (s0, g 0). To keep the illustration simple, we further as-
sume that the utility is separable in both one’s own and a partner’s payoffs.
The hypotheses that we test are similar if they are relaxed. So if a and b are the
payoffs of the player and his partner, respectively, the utility the player gets is
given by
usg a, bð Þ 5 a 1 bs,g ,s0,g 0 bð Þ:
With this setup, we present the decision rule for each game.
A. Trust Game
In the trust game, the player must decide whether to invest the amount P in
his partner, in which case the partner may return some amount r ∈ ½0, 3P
back to him or keep everything. We assume that the player formulates sub-
jective expectations about how much the partner will send back and that this
expectation Es,g,s 0,g 0(.) depends on the gender and social background of both the
player and the partner.
The player’s expected utility is thus given by
max P , Es,g ,s0,g 0 r 1 bs,g ,s0,g 0 3P 2 rð Þ
  
5 max P, Es,g ,s0,g 0 rð Þ 1 bs,g ,s0,g 0 3P 2 Es,g ,s0,g 0 rð Þ
  
:
The player will choose to invest in the trust game (is,g ,s0,g 0 5 1) if
P < Es,g ,s0,g 0 rð Þ 1 bs,g,s0,g 0 3P 2 Es,g ,s0,g 0 rð Þ
 
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12 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G ENote that the utility function of the player depends on both the player’s expec-
tations about how much the partner will send back as well as the function b(.).
Consider two players with characteristics (s, g), both matched with a partner of
background s0 but of different genders.Wemay observe the same decision rule,
but the students could still have different expectations Es,g,s 0,m(r) and Es,g,s 0,f (r)
and different functions bs,g,s 0,m(.) and bs,g,s 0,f (.). In other words, observing no gen-
der discrimination in the trust game does not rule out that expectations and
tastes bs,g,s 0,g 0(.) do not differ by gender. Similarly, if we do observe different in-
vestment decisions in the trust game, we cannot conclude whether the nature
of the discrimination is taste based (i.e., different b0s) and/or whether it is sta-
tistical (i.e., different expectations about returns). However, using other games
can allow us to tease this out. We discuss them next.B. Dictator Game
In the dictator game, the player must decide how to allocate an amount A be-
tween himself and his partner. His decision problem of how much to allocate
to the partner (i.e., d ) is therefore
maxd A 2 d 1 bs,g,s0,g 0 dð Þ
 
such that d ∈ 0, A½ :
We have a corner solution where the player allocates zero to the other player
if the function bs,g ,s 0,g 0 ðdÞ < 1 8 d ∈ ½0, A and A if the function is greater
than 1 over the range of d. Otherwise, the first-order condition gives the op-
timal amount d s,g,s 0,g 0 as follows:
b0s,g ,s0,g 0 d
s,g ,s0,g 0
 
5 1:
Consider two players with characteristics (s, g), both matched with a partner of
background s 0 but of different genders. Observing different allocations to the
partners of different genders means that there is gender discrimination. More-
over, this discrimination is taste based.
C. Expectations
Respondents are asked to guess the average amount that students from the
partner’s institution chose to send back to their matched partner from the re-
spondent’s institution in the trust game. They should report Es,g,s 0,g 0(r). Consider
two players with characteristics (s, g) both matched with a partner of back-
ground s 0 but of different genders. Different reports of expectations by gender
would mean that there is gender discrimination; moreover, this discrimination
is statistical.This content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 13IV. Experimental Design
A. Procedure
The experiments were conducted at the students’ institutions in sessions of
50–100 students in a classroom large enough to ensure respondent anonymity.
The instructions were given to each participant, read aloud by the experiment-
ers, and projected on a computer projector. Respondents played the games on
a paper questionnaire and were matched with an actual partner ex post, so
they did not learn the identity or action of their partner while playing the game.
The questionnaire was administered in Urdu at all places except one of the lib-
eral universities where it was conducted in English because students there are
more used to reading and writing in English.6 Moreover, the questionnaires
were identical across all of the institutions up to the section leading into the
experiments.
B. Games
Students were asked to play the following games.
1. Trust Game
Player A (the sender) is given a fixed amount of money (Rs 300) and decides
whether to keep it or invest it by giving it to player B (the receiver). If the money
is given to player B, the experimenter triples that amount and gives it to player B,
who is asked to choose whether to transfer anymoney back to player A (which can
be any amount between zero and Rs 900). The efficient outcome is for player A
to invest the money by transferring it to player B, whereas the subgame perfect
equilibrium is to keep the money. Lack of trust toward the partner may lead to
inefficiencies. This is a binary version of the trust game introduced by Berg et al.
(1995)—it is binary in the sense that player A can choose to send either nothing
or the entire amount. In our setting, all respondents played the role of player A
and the role of a player B (but as we explain later, students were compensated at
most for one of these roles chosen at random).When put in the role of player B,
we use the strategy method and ask the respondent to report the amount he/she
would like to send back, conditional on player A deciding to invest.
2. Dictator Game
This is a one-stage game in which player A (the sender) decides on the division
of a fixed amount of money (Rs 400) between himself or herself and player B6 The translation was supervised by B. Zafar (who speaks English and Urdu fluently) to ensure that
nothing was lost in translation.
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14 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E(the receiver). Player B does not make any choice. Again, respondents play the
role of both player A as well as player B.7
3. Expectations
Respondents were asked to guess the average amount that students from their
partner’s institution (i.e., institution of the student in the role of player B)
chose to send back to their matched partners—player A (who were all students
at the respondent’s own institution)—in the trust game. Note that when stu-
dents were asked to provide their expectations, they were asked about the av-
erage payoffs for a pair of partners that is identical in terms of gender and in-
stitution of the match. Also, expectations were elicited after the respondents
had made the decision in the games and were incentivized.8
C. Treatment
The treatment in this experiment is the randomization of institution and gen-
der of the matched player. Each student was randomlymatched with one of the
five following partners: a male student from a liberal university, a female stu-
dent from a liberal university, a male student from an Islamic university, a
female student from an Islamic university, or a male madrassa student. The
description of the match (with the exact name of the match’s educational
institution and the partner’s gender) was already printed on the paper question-
naire received by each participant, so students were not aware that other par-
ticipants in their session could possibly be matched with partners of a different
gender and educational institution.9 Each student was informed that they7 We chose a binary trust game and a continuous dictator game in order to make the differences in the
decisions salient to the respondents. Because our sample pool is quite different from standard exper-
imental settings and we were concerned about the literacy of the respondents and their ability to un-
derstand the decisions, we kept the games as simple and as distinct as possible from each other.
8 While we want to measure the respondent’s expectation of the amount his partner sends back in the
trust game, we ask the respondent to guess the average amount sent back by all students of the same
gender as the match from the partner’s institution (who are matched with students in the respondent’s
institution). This is because asking the respondent for his expectation of the amount sent back by his
partner may prompt the respondent to report expectations that rationalize his own investment deci-
sion in the trust game. We believe our approach mitigates this concern of ex post rationalization and is
thus superior. The exact wording of the question was as follows: “If you, the sender, sent Rs 300 in this
game, the responder would receive Rs 900 and had to decide how much to return to the sender and
how much to keep for themself. Now we ask you to guess the average amount (out of Rs 900) that
students of gender (where gender 5 {male, female}) from institution X chose to return to students
from your institution. Your reward will depend on your accuracy. You would receive Rs 50 for choos-
ing the correct interval and zero otherwise. The interval that contains the average amount is. . . .”
9 As mentioned in Sec. II.A, we had two participating liberal universities. Students belonging to
those and matched with someone from a liberal university were matched with someone of their own
university.
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Delavande and Zafar 15would play all the games with the same partner. Students were given a short de-
scription of the institution they were matched with, but because the selected in-
stitutions are among the most well-known institutions, most students would
have some prior knowledge of them. We therefore have a between-subject de-
sign. Each student was matched with only one partner of a given gender and in-
stitution and could not have known whether other students were matched with
someone from a different institution or of a different gender (and what other po-
tential institutions may have been involved). In terms of implementation, the
pairing was carried out after the experiment with replacement, and the match
was one way. This means that multiple students could possibly have been
matched with the same partner, and the partner with whom the student was
matched may or may not have been matched with the same student. Table 2
presents the sample sizes for each institution and for the various matches.10 Be-
cause we use a one-way match, the sum in a given row does not need to match
the sum in the corresponding column.
D. Payoffs
Respondents received financial compensation for their participation in the sur-
vey and the games. Each received a show-up fee of Rs 200 given on the day of
the session. Some tasks were then randomly chosen for determining the addi-
tional payoffs. One of the four roles (sender or receiver in the trust game, sender
or receiver in the dictator game) was randomly selected for compensation along
with one of the four expectations questions (Rs 50 if the respondent correctlyTABLE 2
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS BY MATCH
Respondent
HighSES MidSES
Madrassa TotalMale Female Male Female
HighSES:
Male 153 145 141 158 161 758
Female 40 47 57 33 26 203
MidSES:
Male 89 87 86 87 95 444
Female 57 56 54 53 66 286
Madrassa 236 217 198 132 362 1,145
Total 575 552 536 463 710 2,83610 Students at madrassas who
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16 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eidentified the interval where the actual average lies). Before making their deci-
sions, students were informed that they would receive compensation for one
of the four roles chosen at random. Once the sessions were completed, we ran-
domly matched students with a particular partner from the institution/gender
indicated in their questionnaire (and who also had to be matched with a partner
of those characteristics) and determined the payoffs. Subjects could pick up their
compensation starting about 1 week after the completion of the experiment. Re-
spondents earned an average of Rs 600 from the games. The overall average com-
pensation of Rs 800 corresponds to about $10. This is the equivalent of about
three meals at inexpensive restaurants or a monthly pass of local transport. The
2009 per capita gross national income (GNI) at purchasing power parity in Pa-
kistan was $2,710 compared with $46,730 in the United States. This means the
average compensation of $10 corresponds to 0.4% of the GNI per capita. The
US equivalent would be approximately $170. Therefore, the stakes involved in
the experiments were large.
V. Experimental Results
Ourmain goals are (1) to identify whether there is gender discrimination in the
trust game, that is, whether players’ behavior differs by the gender of the part-
ner; (2) to analyze the nature (statistical vs. taste based) of this potential dis-
crimination; and (3) to investigate whether potentially discriminatory behavior
varies according to the institutions of both the primary player and his or her
partner. The theoretical model in Section III highlights the challenge we face
in the identification of discrimination. We therefore start by establishing
whether there is any discrimination in the trust game and then move on to an-
alyze the behavior in the dictator game and the expectations data.
Because participants may treat partners from different institutions differ-
ently for reasons unrelated to gender, our test for gender discrimination will
always be done by comparing how males and females from the same institu-
tion are treated. This comparison relies on the assumption that our respon-
dents have the same beliefs about the distribution of observable characteristics
of males and females at a given institution. Instead, for example, if individuals
believed that MidSES females were from higher-income households (com-
pared with MidSES males) and other-regarding preferences were declining
in the partner’s SES background, then the propensity to send less to MidSES
females (than corresponding males) would be statistical discrimination. As
shown in Section II.B, at both MidSES and HighSES, females tend to come
from slightly more advantaged backgrounds than their male counterparts.We be-
lieve it is quite unlikely that students are aware of these small differences (the gen-
der difference in characteristics within the institutions was a surprise to us andThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 17our survey team), but we cannot rule this out entirely. Our focus is on gender
discrimination by males, so in what follows, players are always male, whereas
partners can be male or female.
A. Gender Discrimination
We begin by testing the following hypothesis:All uHYPOTHESIS 1. There is no gender discrimination in the trust game, con-
ditional on partners’ institutions.Table 3 presents the overall proportion of senders who chose to send the
Rs 300 in the trust game, conditional on the institution and gender of both
the sender and the responder. In order to test for gender discrimination, we
investigate whether investment behavior in the trust game varies by gender of
the partner, keeping the institution of the partner and gender and institution
of the primary player fixed. For respondents belonging to a row institution, test-
ing this hypothesis means testing for differences in the investment behaviorTABLE 3
PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO SEND MONEY IN TRUST GAME
Respondent
Total
Matched with
HighSES MidSES
Madrassa
Male
HighSES Male 1
MidSES Female
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HighSES male:
Proportion .718 .667 .703 .787 .709 .727 .725 .706
N 758 153 145 141 158 161 294 303
MidSES male:
Proportion .631 .551 .689*,1 .628 .621 .663 .589 .655
N 444 89 87 86 87 95 175 174
Madrassa male:
Proportion .790 .826 .816 .808 .682***,111 .782 .818 .765*,1
N 1,145 236 217 198 132 362 434 349
p-value:a
F-test .0000 .0000 .0165 .0011 .3532 .0164 .0000 .0077
Kruskal-Wallis test .0000 .0000 .0168 .0012 .352 .0165 .0000 .0078This cont
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types of pairwise tests for equality of proportions (who send money) for those having a match with a
HighSES male vs. a HighSES female and those matched with a MidSES male vs. a MidSES female.
The p-values for these tests are not reported but are denoted by asterisks (t-test) and plus signs (Wilcoxon
rank sum test) in columns for female matches.
a The p-values of tests for equality of means (F-test) and distributions (Kruskal-Wallis test) across
institutions.
* p < .10.
*** p < .01.
1 p < .10.
111 p < .01.17 AM
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18 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ewhen matched with HighSES males versus HighSES females and for testing
for differences when matched with MidSES males versus MidSES females. As
a robustness check, we also test for differences when aggregating HighSES and
MidSES males versus HighSES and MidSES females.
Table 3 provides two important results. First, HighSES males do not dis-
criminate in their behavior according to the gender of the matched partner,
even after taking into consideration the institution of the match. This is dem-
onstrated by the fact that none of the two sets of pairwise hypothesis tests that
we conduct (Wilcoxon rank sum and t-test) between having a match with a
male versus a female of a given institution type is statistically significant at con-
ventional levels of significance for HighSES males. Second, holding the insti-
tution of the matched partner fixed, we notice statistically significant differences
by gender in the behavior of MidSES and madrassa students, which reveals
important interaction between gender and institutions. MidSES male students
treat MidSES males and MidSES females similarly, but they treat HighSES fe-
males more favorably that they treat HighSESmales: 55% of the MidSESmales
sent money when matched with a HighSES male compared with 68% when
matchedwith aHighSES female (the difference is statistically different from zero
at 10%). We also find that madrassa students treat HighSES males and High-
SES females similarly, but they treat MidSES females less favorably than Mid-
SES males: 80% of the madrassas students sent money when matched with a
MidSESmale compared with only 68% when matched with a MidSES female
(the difference is statistically significant at 1%).
Columns 1 and 2 of table A1 analyze behavior in the trust game using a lin-
ear regression framework. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a
participant sent money in the trust game. In column 1, the independent var-
iables include dummies for every potential pair of partners. For example, the
first dummy variable—HighSES playerMidSES partner—equals 1 for a pair
in which the player is a HighSES male and the partner is from MidSES. Sim-
ilarly, the second dummy—HighSES player  (MidSES partner  female)—
equals 1 for a pair in which the player is a HighSES male and the partner is
from MidSES and is female. The average behavior of a HighSES male student
matched with a male MidSES student is captured by the first variable, whereas
the average behavior of a HighSES male student matched with a female Mid-
SES student is reflected by the sum of these two variables. By comparing these
two coefficients, we can test for whether MidSES females are treated differently
than MidSES males by HighSES males. We do find similar results as in table 3:
madrassa males are found to treat MidSES females less favorably than they treat
MidSES males. The coefficient madrassa player  (MidSES partner  female)
indicates that they are 13.4 percentage points less likely to send money to Mid-
SES females in the trust game (relative to when matched with MidSES males),This content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 19and the coefficient is statistically significant at 5%. We also see that MidSES
males treat HighSES females more favorably than HighSES males (coefficient
statistically significant at 1%), whereas they treat MidSES males and females
similarly. Notably, in column 2 when we add demographic characteristics as
controls, we see that the coefficient of the dummies for the pairs is essentially
unchanged.
B. Nature of Discrimination
These results highlight differences in how males invest (i.e., whether they send
money to the matched partner) in the trust game depending on the gender of
their partners, holding institutions fixed. As highlighted in the theoretical frame-
work, there are several dimensions of preferences and beliefs that may motivate
a subject to invest in the trust game. One motivation could be unconditional
other-regarding preferences. Another one could be beliefs about trustworthiness
of the partner (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000; Cox 2004; Ashraf, Bohnet, and
Piankov 2006). Finally, risk preferences may play a role in the decision (Karlan
2005; Schechter 2007).11
Empirically, determining which one has the largest weight in influencing
behavior is important to understand the nature of players’ discriminatory be-
havior. This is of interest to academics but of particular relevance to policy
makers because effective policies and legislation to deal with gender discrimi-
nation can be crafted only if the nature of discrimination is understood. For
example, although HighSES males exhibit similar investment behavior in the
trust game toward males and females conditional on match institution, as we
explain in Section III, their action could still be consistent with different levels
of trust and of unconditional other-regarding behavior toward males and fe-
males. Results from the trust game alone do not allow the identification of the
relative roles of those dimensions (Cox 2004). However, our multiple-game ex-
perimental design allows us to separately measure unconditional other-regarding
behavior and expected trustworthiness and therefore informs us about the nature
of discrimination under the assumption that the only difference between men
and women within an institution is gender. In the dictator game, the only motive
for sending money to the partner is preferences (unconditional other-regarding
behavior). We can thus learn more about taste-based discrimination by analyz-
ing how students play that game. In addition, the elicitation of expected average11 Students were randomly assigned a treatment (i.e., match type). Therefore, differences in risk pref-
erences cannot explain any of the results (across match types). We have qualitative measures of risk
preferences from the respondents, and they are in fact similar within each treatment, conditional on
the student’s institution.
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20 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eamount sent back by each match group to students from their own institution
gives us a measure of expected trustworthiness toward each group and therefore
an indication of statistical discrimination.
We test the following hypothesis:12 Th
mean
equal
rank
obser
with
equal
test i
All uHYPOTHESIS 2. Conditional on the partner’s institution, expectations of
the partner’s trustworthiness do not differ by the partner’s gender.We collected data on respondents’ expectations regarding the average amount
anticipated from the matched group. Note that respondents choose an interval
for the average expected amount and do not report a point estimate for the ex-
act average. The mean and median amounts presented in table 4 are those ob-
tained by allocating as average expected amount the middle of the chosen in-
terval. To show the distribution of expectations, we also present the proportion
of respondents who expect to receive more than Rs 200 and Rs 300. Those are
obtained directly from respondents’ answers without any assumption. Again,
we focus on the differences in expectations by gender, keeping the institution
of the match fixed.
Three points from this table are of note. First,HighSES students believemales
and females within an institution are equally trustworthy: none of the three sets
of pairwise hypothesis tests—t-test, Wilcoxon rank sum, and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov—for having a match of a male versus female for a given institution
type (HighSES male vs. HighSES female; MidSES male vs. MidSES female)
are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance for HighSES
males.12 Second, we again note some differences by gender of the matched part-
ner forMidSES students.MidSESmales believeMidSES females to be less trust-
worthy than MidSES males (difference in the mean is statistically significant
from zero at 10%), whereas they expect HighSES females to be more trustwor-
thy thanHighSESmales (the proportion expected to send backmore thanRs 200
is statistically significant at 10%). Recall that they weremore likely to sendmoney
to HighSES females in the trust game, so positive statistical discrimination
may explain this. Note, however, that there was no difference in their invest-
ment behavior by gender for partners from MidSES. Third, madrassa studentse p-values for these tests are not reported in the table. Instead, they are denoted by asterisks on the
, median, and sample size in the relevant female column. The t-test is a parametric test for the
ity of the means (under the assumption that the variable is normally distributed); the Wilcoxon
sum test is a nonparametric analog to the t-test and is a rank sum test. TheWilcoxon test ranks all
vations from both groups and then sums the ranks from one of the groups, which is compared
the expected rank sum. It is possible for groups to have different rank sums (and thus the test of
ity being rejected) and yet have equal or nearly equal medians. Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
s a nonparametric test for the equality of continuous distributions.
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Delavande and Zafar 21expect females tobemore trustworthy thanmales. Inparticular,madrassa students
expect females to return about Rs 25 more on average than their male counter-
parts (this difference is statistically significant at 5% when aggregating HighSES
and MidSES) and assign an 8 percentage point higher probability to females
sending back more than Rs 300 than males (this difference is statistically signif-
icant at 10% for both MidSES and HighSES). Similar qualitative results areTABLE 4
AMOUNT EXPECTED BACK FROM MATCH OF RS 900
Respondent
Total
Matched with
HighSES MidSES
Madrassa
Male
HighSES Male 1
HighSES Female
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HighSES male:
Mean 369.79 363.1 374.8 387.6 383.5 342.6 374.8 379.4
Median 350.00 350.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 350.0 350.0 450.0
Proportion
expecting:
>Rs 200 .897 .895 .917 .901 .905 .870 .898 .911
>Rs 300 .722 .712 .766 .745 .759 .634 .728 .762
N 758 153 145 141 158 161 294 303
MidSES male:
Mean 354.28 333.2 355.8 379.1 341.9* 361.6 355.7 348.9
Median 350.00 350.0 350.0 350.0 350.0 450.0 350.0 350.0
Proportion
expecting:
>Rs 200 .869 .787 .885* .930 .828** .916 .857 .856
>Rs 300 .694 .640 .667 .756 .701 .705 .697 .684
N 444 89 87 86 87 95 175 174
Madrassa male:
Mean 412.22 404.1 425.4 405.9 429.4 406.8 404.9 426.9**
Median 450.00 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0*
Proportion
expecting:
>Rs 200 .923 .919 .926 .919 .947 .917 .919 .934
>Rs 300 .799 .750 .839** .783 .856* .796 .765 .845***
N 1,133 233 215 195 131 359 428 346
p-value:
F-testa .000 .000 .000 .297 .000 .000 .000 .000
Median testb .000 .003 .000 .075 .001 .001 .000 .000
Kruskal-Wallis
testc .000 .000 .000 .110 .000 .000 .000 .000This
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male and having a match with a MidSES male vs. a MidSES female: (1) for the amount expected in the trust
game, t-test on the means, Wilcoxon rank sum test on the medians, and Kolmogrov-Smirnov test on the
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for these tests are not reported, but their significance is denoted by asterisk in columns for femalematches.
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c Kruskal-Wallis test for the equality of distributions across institutions.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.9:17 AM
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22 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eshown in a regression framework with and without demographic controls
in columns 3 and 4 of table A1. Recall that madrassa students were less likely
to send money to MidSES females in the trust game. The results presented in
table 4 suggest that statistical discrimination cannot explain their differen-
tial behavior by gender in the trust game. In fact, keeping unconditional other-
regarding behavior constant, given that madrassa students expect females to be
more trustworthy than males, they should be investing more in the trust game
when matched with females than with males.
Overall, this would suggest that the gender discrimination observed in the
trust game bymadrassa students is unlikely to be statistical and most likely taste
based. Behavior in the dictator game—where the main motivation for send-
ing money to the matched partner is unconditional other-regarding behavior—
allows us to investigate this further.
We next test the following hypothesis:All uHYPOTHESIS 3. Conditional on the partner’s institution, the amount sent
in the dictator game does not differ by the partner’s gender.Table 5 shows the average amounts sent in the dictator game for all pairs of
partners. Madrassa students send lower amounts on average to females than
males. The differences appear not to be statistically significant whenwe consider
each institution separately, but if we compare females from MidSES and High-
SES against males fromMidSES and HighSES (cols. 7, 8), we find a statistically
significant difference in average amount sent using a t-test (p 5 :051) and using
theWilcoxon rank sum test (p 5 :032). This suggests that madrassas students
exhibit taste-based discrimination against females.
Regarding HighSES and MidSES males, the three sets of pairwise hypoth-
esis tests between having a match with a male versus female of a given institu-
tion type (HighSES male vs. HighSES female; MidSES male vs. MidSES fe-
male) that we conduct are not statistically significant, suggesting that there is
no significant taste-based discrimination by those groups of students. However,
a much higher proportion of MidSES males send nothing in the dictator game
to MidSES females compared with MidSES males (26.7% vs. 16.3%), and the
difference is statistically significant at 10%. This is consistent with some form
of taste-based discrimination against MidSES females. Columns 5 and 6 of ta-
ble A1 investigate this within a regression framework and show similar qualita-
tive (though less precisely estimated) results.
We now summarize all our results presented so far by institutions:
Result 1. HighSES male students do not discriminate by gender in the
trust game and the dictator game, and they believe males and females withinThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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24 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ean institution to be equally trustworthy. This is consistent with no (statistical
or taste-based) gender discrimination.
Result 2. MidSES male students favor HighSES females in the trust game
but treat MidSES males and MidSES females similarly. They believe MidSES
females to be less trustworthy than MidSES males, but they believe HighSES
females to be more trustworthy than HighSES males. They do not discriminate
by gender in the dictator game (although they are more likely not to send any-
thing to MidSES females). This is consistent with statistical discrimination in
favor of HighSES females and (primarily statistical) discrimination against Mid-
SES females compared with their male counterparts.
Result 3. Male madrassa students discriminate against MidSES females
(but not HighSES females) in their investment behavior in the trust game. This
is despite the fact that they believe females to be more trustworthy than males.
They discriminate by gender in the dictator game, which is consistent with ex-
hibiting taste-based discrimination against both MidSES and HighSES females.
The focus in this paper is on male behavior. We also have a small sample of
women from MidSES and HighSES. We present some descriptive statistics in
table A2 on their behavior and expectations for completeness. As we find for
males, HighSES females do not discriminate by gender in the trust game and
the dictator game, and they believe males and female within an institution to
be equally trustworthy. However, MidSES females discriminate against High-
SES females (but not MidSES females) in the trust game. They also have lower
expectations of the trustworthiness of HighSES females relative to HighSES
males. In addition, they send a significantly lower amount to HighSES females
relative to HighSES males in the dictator game and a larger amount to females
than to males at MidSES. This is consistent with taste-based discrimination
in favor of MidSES females and both taste-based and statistical discrimination
against HighSES females.
C. Relative versus Absolute Position
Thus far, the focus of our study led us to analyze behavior and perceptions
toward males and females within an institution (or social identity). From the
women’s perspective, such discrimination is relevant for their well-being if they
care about their relative position compared with men of similar social identity.
Recent empirical work has documented a systematic correlation between mea-
sures of relative income and happiness/subjective well-being (e.g., Luttmer
2005; Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008) and reported job satisfaction and turn-
over (e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996; Card et al. 2012). Absolute position may
also be relevant to women, and it is therefore interesting to evaluate which
groups of males treat females better in absolute terms. The last few rows inThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 25tables 3 and 5 report the p-values of the F-test and Kruskal-Wallis test, testing
for equality of means and distribution for each column of matched partner
(i.e., conditional on a match group, testing for equality of means and distribu-
tion across institutions). It enables us to investigate whether there are system-
atic differences by groups in their investment behavior for table 3 or other-
regarding behavior for table 5 toward MidSES and HighSES females. Table 3
shows that there are statistically significant differences (as indicated by the
low p-values of the two tests in the last two rows) and that a higher proportion
of madrassa students invest with female partners at bothMidSES andHighSES
compared with HighSES and MidSES males. A similar pattern is observed in
the dictator game: madrassa students give more to female students in the dic-
tator game than any other groups of males. This is because madrassa students
tend to invest more in the trust game and give more in the dictator game than
the other groups of males. Thus, even though they treat females worse than
males, they still treat females better than the other groups of males.
More generally, column 1 in both tables 3 and 5 shows that students in the
various institutions differ significantly in their investment behavior and dictator
game split, respectively. Conditional on matches with male students (cols. 2,
4, 6, and 7 of both tables), we see that madrassa students exhibit significantly
higher trust and stronger unconditional other-regarding behavior. We do not
explore this point in this paper because here the focus is on gender discrimina-
tion. This issue is discussed in detail in our previous study (Delavande and
Zafar 2015).
It should also be pointed out that compared with existing studies, we find
very high levels of trust and other-regarding behavior in our sample. In our pre-
vious study (Delavande and Zafar 2015), we present detailed evidence that
these high levels of pro-social behavior are not a consequence of other con-
founds, such as students not understanding the games or not finding the incen-
tives credible.
D. Accuracy of Expectations
If respondents act on their expectations and play according to social preferences
equilibrium, it is these expectations thatmatter in explaining their choices, regard-
less of whether they are correct. However, if expectations are incorrect for a par-
ticular group, it implies incorrect stereotypes for that group, which could result in
inefficiencies in actual interactions in the society. Inaccurate expectations also im-
ply there may be a case for policy interventions that disseminate accurate infor-
mation. We therefore investigate how the expectations of the partner’s trustwor-
thiness match with actual trustworthiness (amount sent back in the trust game
from the trustee) and whether there are any systematic gender biases.This content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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26 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G ETable 6 compares the males’ expected amount received from the match with
the average amount actually sent back by males and females. We show the pro-
portion of (male) students who expected more than Rs 300 from a given group
and the proportion of students from that group who actually sent more than
Rs 300. The third row in each panel reports the p-value for the equality of these
two proportions. In addition, we also show the proportion of students who had
accurate expectations, that is, those who chose the interval that contained the
actual average.
Table 6 shows that HighSES males have more accurate expectations about
females than about males: they expect bothmales and females to give more than
Rs 300 on equal footing, but males actually tend to give less. MidSES malesTABLE 6
HOW MALE STUDENTS’ EXPECTATIONS COMPARE WITH ACTUAL CHOICES OF TRUSTEES
Respondent
Total
Matched with
HighSES MidSES
Madrassa
MaleMale Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighSES:
Proportion expecting >Rs 300 .722 .712 .766 .745 .759 .634
Proportion match sent >Rs 300 .715 .62 .775*** .584 .719 .814
Actual vs. expecteda 1.000 .0901 .9006 .0108 .5508 .0001
Proportion accurate expectation .365 .275 .517*** .241 .487***,111 .304
N 758 153 145 141 158 161
MidSES
Proportion expecting >Rs 300 .694 .640 .667 .756 .701 .705
Proportion match sent >Rs 300 .748 .745 .737 .756 .722 .758
Actual vs. expecteda .715 .0923 .3748 1 .7906 .3406
Proportion accurate expectation .372 .303 .368 .442 .276**,11 .463
N 444 89 87 86 87 95
Madrassa male:
Proportion expecting >Rs 300 .799 .750 .839**,11 .783 .856*,1 .796
Proportion match sent >Rs 300 .738 .708 .577 .779 .712 .757
Actual vs. expecteda .127 .3551 .0012 .9403 .0152 .2124
Proportion accurate expectation .366 .127 .488***,111 .455 .197***,111 .461
N 1,145 236 217 198 132 362This content downloa
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portions (plus signs) and (2) t-tests for equality of proportions (asterisks).
a p-value of t-test for the equality of proportion that expect >Rs 300 and the proportion of match group
that actually send back >Rs 300.
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Delavande and Zafar 27tend to underestimate the trustworthiness of HighSES males, but there are
no systematic patterns by gender of the match. In contrast, madrassa students
have inaccurate expectations by gender. Although their expectations about re-
ceiving more than Rs 300 when matched with males are fairly similar to actual
receipts, they overestimate this probability for females by at least 15 percentage
points. This overestimation is driven by both madrassa students expecting fe-
males to bemore trustworthy than their male counterparts (table 4) and females
actually sending back less than their male counterparts. Finally, it is interesting
to note that all groups (except MidSES males and madrassa students) underes-
timate the trustworthiness of madrassa students; this is something that we ex-
plore in more detail in our previous study (Delavande and Zafar 2015).
VI. Discussion of Confounding Factors and Potential Mechanisms
We find that madrassa students are the only group of males who discriminate
against females (fromMidSES) in the trust game. A relevant question for policy
is the extent to which this result is a consequence of selection into institutions
versus teaching at the institutions. It is hard to speculate about the role of ma-
drassa teachings and environment in explaining our results. The relationship
between Islam and treatment of women remains contentious (see Adida, Laitin,
and Valfort 2014). Despite widespread gender imbalances observed in Muslim
societies, Islamic teachings state that men and women are both equal, and Islam
accords rights of inheritance and ownership to women (Badawi 1995; Lewis
2003).13 However, many of the Islamic ancient texts and imperatives are open
to interpretation, and there is considerable variation in how they are imple-
mented. We also know little about how madrassas teach their students to inter-
pret these texts and rulings.We present some suggestive evidence that may shed
light on whether the behavior of madrassa students toward females is driven by
selection, religious teaching, or both.
We conduct the following thought experiment within the pool of madrassa
students. In another part of the survey, respondents were asked which type of
institutions they would attend if they were admitted to all institution types and
all expenses would be covered. Twelve percent of madrassa students stated that
they would choose to attend a nonmadrassa institution under those conditions
(i.e., would switch). We can think of these students as not selecting into ma-
drassas on the basis of (observable and unobservable) characteristics because
they would have attended another institution without budget or qualification13 In fact, medieval Islamic societies were far more progressive with regard to female rights than their
European counterparts (Shatzmiller 1997; Lewis 2003).
This content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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28 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Erequirements constraints. That is, the difference in behavior between these stu-
dents and those who would attend a madrassa regardless could arguably iden-
tify the extent to which selection into madrassas drives our results. We find that
this group of students invests at a significantly higher rate with female matches
than students who would have chosen a madrassa anyway: conditional on hav-
ing a female match, the proportion of madrassa students who invest in the trust
game is 93.6% and 72.9%, respectively (p 5 :002 for a pairwise t-test). This
suggests that selection into madrassas plays a role in the gender-discriminating
behavior of madrassa students.
We also look at how the behavior of madrassa students varies by how many
years they have spent in a madrassa environment.14 While the decision of how
many years to spend in a madrassa is not fully exogenous, we describe the
differences in behavior for illustration purposes.15 Conditional on being matched
with female students, the investment rate of madrassa students who have spent
more than 8 years in amadrassa (about one-third of our sample) was 73.9% com-
pared with 78.3% for those who had spent 8 or fewer years in a madrassa (with
the difference not statistically different; p 5 :351). Therefore, more time spent
in a madrassa environment does not seem to be correlated with less trust of
females. These pieces of evidence are suggestive at best but seem to indicate
that selection into a madrassa rather than exposure to the religious teachings
of madrassas is an important factor in explaining the different behavior toward
women (relative to comparable men) that we observe in madrassa students.
The fact that MidSES males—who are closer to madrassa students in terms
of religiosity and wealth but are exposed to very different teachings—exhibit
some form of discrimination against MidSES females (although not in the trust
game) is also consistent with background characteristics being important. We
further investigate the role of SES and religiosity in table 7. Table 1 shows that
within each institution type, there is heterogeneity in terms of income and
religiosity. For example, the proportion of male students from a high-income
family (parents earning more than Rs 32,500 per month) is 69% at HighSES,
32% at MidSES, and 8% at madrassas. Similarly, the proportion of students
with high religiosity (reporting 9 or 10 on the 0–10 scale) is 6% at HighSES,14 The madrassa students in our sample are those pursuing an Alim degree, which is equivalent to a
bachelor’s degree. However, students enrolling in this degree come from different academic back-
grounds. Some of them may have studied in a madrassa throughout, and others may have joined
at different points in time. In our sample, students have spent 7.6 years on average in any madrassa.
However, there is substantial heterogeneity in our sample: 10% of students have spent less than 4 years
in a madrassa, and 10% have spent more than 12 years in a madrassa.
15 If we assume that the selection into madrassas is negative (i.e., students likely to enroll and spend
longer in madrassas are less likely to trust females to begin with)—of which we find some evidence
above—then any difference that we find by years spent in a madrassa would be biased upward.
This content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 298% at MidSES, and 77% at madrassas. The dependent variables in table 7
are the behavior in the games (dummy for investing in the trust game, amount
sent in the dictator game, and amount expected back in the trust game). We
conduct separate regressions by partner’s institutions and evaluate how being
matched with a female partner interacted by measures of SES and religiosity
influence behavior in the games, while controlling for other characteristicsTABLE 7
BEHAVIOR IN GAME BY SOCIOECONOMIC AND RELIGIOSITY STATUS
Dummy for Invest
in Trust Game
Matched toa
Amount Sent
in Dictator Game
Matched tob
Amount Expected
Back in Trust Game
Matched toc
MidSES HighSES MidSES HighSES MidSES HighSES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female partner 2.157* 2.030 225.82* 25.10 26.44 21.05
(.084) (.071) (14.85) (12.03) (26.86) (23.97)
Middle income .008 2.002 218.90* 5.90 2.721 11.21
(.056) (.053) (9.99) (8.88) (18.14) (17.76)
High income 2.053 2.075 228.70** 23.33 24.09 216.45
(.067) (.062) (11.97) (10.43) (21.66) (20.72)
Female partner  middle income 2.029 .011 29.86** 26.92 236.41 3.84
(.083) (.072) (14.81) (12.06) (26.82) (24.11)
Female partner  high income .040 .208** 20.77 5.92 241.97 21.70
(.088) (.080) (15.60) (13.44) (28.20) (26.76)
Moderate religiosity 2.012 .001 11.94 23.64 25.61 26.33
(.053) (.051) (9.40) (8.52) (17.00) (17.06)
High religiosity .067 2.024 11.97 210.06 22.35 19.69
(.060) (.053) (10.56) (8.92) (19.18) (17.85)
Female partner  middle religiosity .097 2.065 212.06 22.22 10.65 25.28
(.075) (.073) (13.37) (12.32) (24.17) (24.61)
Female partner  high religiosity .125 .033 .094 3.07 1.41 8.13
(.084) (.073) (14.92) (12.34) (26.99) (24.59)
Risk general (0–10) .011 .004 .277 21.34 3.33 2.797
(.008) (.008) (1.46) (1.26) (2.65) (2.52)
Ownership index (0–8) .008 .006 2.66* 2.595 .998 2.27
(.009) (.008) (1.58) (1.36) (2.86) (2.72)
Age .000 .010* 1.31 .906 1.43 .615
(.005) (.005) (.949) (.878) (1.70) (1.76)
MidSES university 2.075 2.223*** 251.40*** 240.54*** 236.83** 262.29***
(.053) (.050) (9.41) (8.38) (16.90) (16.70)
HighSES university .066 2.149** 4.05 236.65*** 27.00 234.81**
(.055) (.050) (9.78) (8.44) (17.63) (16.83)
Constant .682*** .597*** 152.20*** 177.85*** 351.19*** 376.75***
(.133) (.130) (23.84) (21.84) (42.962) (43.78)
Number of observations 793 904 792 898 789 900This content downloa
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a Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of dummy for investment in trust game.
b OLS regression of amount sent in dictator game (Rs 0–400).
c OLS regression of amount expected back from partner in trust game (Rs 0–900).
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.9:17 AM
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30 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eand, importantly, the main player’s institution. Column 2 of table 7 shows that
among players matched with a partner from HighSES, those from a high-
income household are on average 20.8 percentage points more likely to invest
in the trust game with females than those from a low-income family (the esti-
mate is statistically significant at 5%). In column 3 we see that among players
matched with a partner from MidSES, those from a low-income family on av-
erage give less in the dictator game to females compared with those frommiddle-
or high-income families: males frommiddle- (high-) income families send Rs 30
(Rs 21) more to female partners from MidSES (however, only the estimate for
female partner interacted with middle income is statistically significant). In
table 7, we see that none of the interaction terms between female partner
and religiosity are statistically different from zero. This is consistent with
the idea that our results are driven by SES rather than religiosity: men from
lower SES seem more prone to discriminate against women from poorer
backgrounds.
It should be pointed out that the only institution where we find thatmales do
not treat female partners differently—HighSES—has gender-mixed education.
The limited interaction between genders in the gender-segregatedMidSES and
madrassa environments may lead to prejudice and incorrect beliefs about fe-
males. In the Indian context, Rao (2013) finds that being mixed with poor stu-
dents makes other students overall exhibit more pro-social behavior. However,
in our context, we also find that madrassa students severely overestimate the
amount returned by female matches in the trust game (they expect on average
85% of women to send back more than Rs 300 in the trust game, whereas 67%
do so), so it is not clear whether increased interactions with females would mit-
igate the discrimination that we observe.
Higher-SES children are likely to grow up in a very different family context
that may shape their perception of gender difference. In a Western country
context, Deckers et al. (2015) show that SES is a powerful predictor of many
facets of a child’s personality, including time preferences, risk preferences, and
altruism. They discuss potential pathways and document thatmany dimensions
of a child’s environment (such as parenting style, quantity and quality of parent-
children interactions, the mother’s IQ and economic preferences, and family
structure) differ significantly by SES. We do not have data to support this, but
higher-SES Pakistani children may be brought up with a more equal notion of
gender by their parents. In a similar vein, it is also worthwhile to point out that
in our sample, students from higher-income families tend to live in households
where the difference between themother’s and father’s education is significantly
smaller; the (motherminus father) difference is21.6 years of education in above-
median income families comparedwith23.6 years of education in below-medianThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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Delavande and Zafar 31income families (differences statistically different at the <1% level). As a result,
mothers in higher-SES families may have more bargaining power within the
household, exposing children to a more balanced relationship between mothers
and fathers.
In addition to individual characteristics, external factors (such as competi-
tion in the labor and marriage market) may also be responsible for some of
the patterns in the data. For example, because they hail from a less privileged
background, MidSES students may feel that they need to behave differently
when facing someone from a higher SES in order to reach a position similar
to that of individuals from that status. This may explain why in the trust game
MidSES males favor females of higher social class (relative to men of higher
social class) but not women who belong to the same social class as themselves.
In Section II.B, we note that at both MidSES and HighSES, females tend to
come from slightly more advantaged backgrounds than their male counterparts.
One may therefore wonder whether looking at gender discrimination while
holding the institution fixed truly isolates gender discrimination. As we men-
tioned above, we believe it is quite unlikely that students are aware of these
small differences. We also note that despite the fact that females have higher
SES than men in both institutions, the discrimination we highlight is asym-
metric: HighSES females tend to be favored compared with corresponding
males, whereas MidSES females tend to be disadvantaged compared with
MidSES males. If students are aware of these differences and if higher SES
mitigates discrimination, this suggests that the discrimination we find against
MidSES females would have been worse if they were perceived to be of similar
socioeconomic characteristics as their male counterparts.
VII. Conclusion
This paper shows interesting interactions between social identity and gender
discrimination in the Pakistani context: gender discrimination is not uniform
across educated Pakistani society and varies in nature and intensity as a function
of the social identity of both individuals who interact. We fail to find evidence
of liberal university (HighSES) male students—who are wealthier, less reli-
gious, and more exposed to Western ideas—discriminating against women.
Madrassa students—who come from more humble backgrounds and are more
religious and relatively unexposed to Western ideas—exhibit taste-based dis-
crimination against women. However, because they give and trust more than
any other group, they actually treat women almost as well or better (in absolute
terms) than other groups of males in the society. Islamic university (MidSES)
male students—who fare in the middle in terms of wealth and religiosity—have
a less uniform behavior: their behavior toward males and females depends on theThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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university males favor liberal university females and do not favor Islamic uni-
versity females compared with their male counterparts in the trust game, and
they exhibit mostly statistical discrimination against Islamic university females.
Our results are based on economic decision-making experiments. One rea-
son for using this approach is that experiments illustrate actual behavior rather
than what respondents believe and report to be their own behavior. Second,
experiments allow us to investigate the nature of discrimination, something
that is extremely challenging using observational data. To what extent is the
discrimination that we document using these games generalizable to real-world
interactions? We do not have a clear answer to this question because we do not
observe naturally occurring interactions in real settings for the respondents in
our sample. However, evidence from a few studies that combine data from lab-
oratory games that measure social capital and pro-social behavior and data from
real settings indicates that laboratory measures tend to be good predictors of
behavior in real-world situations (Karlan 2005; Benz and Meier 2008; Baran,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2010). While it is unclear how gender discrimination
in trust exactly translates into discrimination in different situations, almost all
bilateral exchanges—in the labor market or other market interactions—do re-
quire trust. For our results to have relevance, it suffices that trust matters and
that some part of the discrimination in trust channels into different dimensions.
Consistent with our experimental results and its potential ramification in the
labor market, we do find that higher-SES women (from the liberal university)
expect to earn as much as their male counterparts after completing their degree,
whereas lower-SES women (from the Islamic university) expect to earn 18%
less on average than their male counterparts.
Because SES is negatively correlated with religiosity and lack of exposure to
Western ideas in our data, we cannot categorically determine the mechanisms
that explain the taste-based gender discrimination that we identify. Yet we pro-
vide some suggestive evidence that SES (rather than religiosity or exposure to
religious teachings) seems to be driving students’ behavior toward women. In-
dependent of the exact mechanisms, within elite groups, higher-status women
are favored and less discriminated against in Pakistan, which may explain why
some are able to reach important leadership positions.
Generally, it is believed that educating women may by itself lead to female
empowerment and thus result in less gender discrimination. In our study, both
groups of females are pursuing the same level of education (bachelor’s degrees)
and studying similar subjects. Yet higher-SES and less religious females are fa-
vored in some instances, and lower-SES andmore religious females are discrim-
inated against by certainmale respondents. Since it is unclear whywomenwouldThis content downloaded from 193.136.112.070 on February 26, 2020 09:29:17 AM
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difference in SES is driving this difference in discrimination. Note, however,
that the behavior of our male respondents matched with male partners does
not differ by the institution of their match; that is, social identity seems to be
irrelevant in the male-male interactions.16 This suggests that when men interact
with women, the woman’s social class is such a powerful construct that it con-
tinues to remain salient. This is particularly striking because we focus on inter-
actions of highly educated individuals in a country where less than 10%of adults
have a bachelor’s degree (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2008).
Our findings present a conundrum for policymakers.Women belonging to a
lower socioeconomic class generally have fewer chances of upward social mobil-
ity and have greater constraints. That females—but only those belonging to the
lower social class—are discriminated against by (certain) males indicates that
those females who are already at a disadvantage to start with are further margin-
alized. This suggests that social identities (e.g., class, ethnicity, race) are a pow-
erful construct, and simply educating women may not be enough to overcome
the distortions that are introduced by these other dimensions. Our results then
imply that policies aimed at empowering women need to take into account the
interaction of gender with social class. For example, simply promoting educa-
tion for girls or allocating quotas to women in political or other spheres may
not be sufficient to change attitudes toward women, and such policies may need
to incorporate other characteristics—such as socioeconomic background—along
with gender.
The taste-based nature of the discriminatory behavior of madrassa students
is also a challenge for policy design. In developed countries such as the United
States, rules forbidding taste-based discrimination have been erected for de-
cades and have been fairly effective at ameliorating taste-based discrimination
(Gneezy, List, and Price 2012). However, in developing settings such as the
one in this study, it is not clear how effective such legislation would be. In ad-
dition, it is generally easier to implement policies that attenuate statistical dis-
crimination by removing information inefficiencies.17On the other hand, success-
ful policies for altering gender tastes are less clear: they require understanding
the formation of preferences, which is a challenging task.16 This can be seen by comparing the investment levels across male matches within an institution (i.e.,
a given row) in table 3 or behavior in the dictator game in table 5. The tables in this paper do not report
results for pairwise comparisons of male matches (all of which are statistically insignificant). Interested
readers are instead referred to Delavande and Zafar (2015), which focuses on male-male matches only.
17 For example, Beaman et al. (2009) find that exposure to female leaders (through mandated quotas)
erases statistical discrimination against them bymale villagers in India but does not alter tastes for them.
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TABLE A1
BEHAVIOR IN GAMES CONDITIONAL ON MATCH AND OBSERVABLES
Dummy for Invest
in Trust Game
Amount Expected
Back in Trust Game
Amount Sent
in Dictator Game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HighSES player  MidSES partner .009 .033 217.59 26.26 5.73 12.09
(.043) (.050) (14.15) (16.14) (7.49) (8.55)
HighSES player 
(MidSES partner  female) 2.084* 2.085* 23.60 23.31 29.85 210.65
(.051) (.050) (16.41) (16.41) (8.69) (8.68)
HighSES player  madrassa partner 2.060 2.026 262.90*** 249.43** 29.22 22.10
(.042) (.048) (13.53) (15.53) (7.17) (8.22)
HighSES player  HighSES partner 2.117** 2.089* 241.66** 229.95* 224.18*** 217.80**
(.042) (.048) (13.71) (15.64) (7.26) (8.28)
HighSES player 
(HighSES partner  female) .043 .050 11.04 12.22 27.88 28.55
(.051) (.051) (16.51) (16.54) (8.74) (8.75)
MidSES player  MidSES partner 2.164** 2.145** 226.16 215.84 241.52*** 238.91***
(.053) (.056) (17.18) (18.30) (9.10) (9.69)
MidSES player 
(MidSES partner  female) .002 .000 236.62* 237.23* 215.72 216.52
(.067) (.067) (21.63) (21.65) (11.48) (11.48)
MidSES player  HighSES partner 2.233*** 2.208*** 271.58*** 260.86*** 233.88*** 231.01**
(.052) (.055) (16.79) (17.86) (8.93) (9.49)
MidSES player 
(HighSES partner  female) .132** .129** 23.91 23.41 7.87 7.59
(.066) (.066) (21.44) (21.44) (11.45) (11.44)
MidSES player  madrassa partner 2.120** 2.097* 242.77** 231.95* 221.35** 218.89**
(.051) (.054) (16.57) (17.70) (8.77) (9.37)
Madrassa player  MidSES partner .030 .034 21.04 2.361 13.69** 13.84**
(.039) (.039) (12.75) (12.77) (6.72) (6.73)
Madrassa player 
(MidSES partner  female) 2.134** 2.144** 27.09* 25.60 29.71 210.51
(.049) (.049) (16.09) (16.14) (8.47) (8.49)
Madrassa player  HighSES partner .049 .053 2.506 2.050 11.64* 12.16*
(.037) (.037) (12.09) (12.11) (6.41) (6.42)
Madrassa player 
(HighSES partner  female) 2.019 2.024 21.14 19.37 28.32 28.78
(.042) (.042) (13.62) (13.63) (7.20) (7.20)
Middle income 2.005 24.45 23.23
(.024) (7.98) (4.22)
High income 2.019 28.19 210.16*
(.030) (9.93) (5.26)
Ownership index (028) .006 2.00 .315
(.005) (1.66) (.879)
Age .010** 1.61 1.49**
(.003) (1.05) (.556)
Moderate religiosity .002 2.26 .829
(.023) (7.44) (3.94)
High religiosity .041 19.41** 2.877
(.027) (8.67) (4.59)
Risk general (0–10) .008* .843 2.932
(.005) (1.54) (.815)This content downlo
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Delavande and Zafar 35TABLE A1 (Continued )
Dummy for Invest
in Trust Game
Amount Expected
Back in Trust Game
Amount Sent
in Dictator Game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant .783*** .500*** 404.73*** 349.18*** 175.48*** 147.03***
(.023) (.080) (7.57) (26.28) (4.01) (13.95)
Number of observations 2,299 2,299 2,289 2,289 2,289 2,289This content downlo
All use subject to University of Chiaded from 193.136.1
cago Press Terms an12.070 on February 26
d Conditions (http://ww, 2020 09:2
w.journalsNote. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of dummy for investment in trust game.
b OLS regression of amount sent in dictator game (Rs 0–400).
c OLS regression of amount expected back from partner in the trust game (Rs 0–900).
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
TABLE A2
FEMALE STUDENTS’ BEHAVIOR AND EXPECTATIONS
Matched with
HighSES MidSES
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Proportion Who Send Money in Trust Game
HighSES female .575 .638 .737 .758
MidSES female .632 .429** .352 .491
B. Amount Expected Back from Match of Rs 900
HighSES female:
Mean 365.0 313.8 334.2 365.2
Proportion expecting >Rs 200 .900 .787 .895 .879
MidSES female:
Mean 357.0 328.6 316.7 331.1
Proportion expecting >Rs 200 .965 .804*** .815 .868
C. Mean Amount Sent in Dictator Game
HighSES female 164.4 172.3 176.3 192.4
MidSES female 153.9 124.9** 111.5 137.7*
N:
HighSES female 40 47 57 33
MidSES female 57 56 54 53Note. We report pairwise t-tests of having a match with a HighSES male vs. a HighSES female and having
a match with a MidSES male vs. a MidSES female. The p-values for these tests are not reported, but their
significance is denoted by asterisks.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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